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IDENTIFYING AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 










This paper uses a structural VAR methodology to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks 
to real output for the South African economy. Demand shocks, in turn, are separated into fiscal 
and  monetary  shocks.  The  model  is  estimated  with  quarterly  data  over  two  overlapping 
samples: 1960Q2-2006Q4 and 1983Q4-2006Q4. The identified (structural) shocks were used in 
a historical decomposition to split output into a measure of potential output (resulting from the 
evolution of supply shocks) and a measure of the business cycle (the gap between actual and 
potential output). This measure of potential output suggests a significant decline relative to 
trend in the years prior to the political transition of 1994 and a swift reversal thereafter.  The 
paper presents evidence from three sources to support its identification of aggregate supply 
and  demand  shocks.  These  sources  are  the  following:  theory  consistent  impulse  response 
functions; a close match between the implied measure of the business cycle and independent 
information about the South African business cycle; and a demonstration of the close match 
between the identified series of aggregate supply shocks and important historical events in the 
decades  prior  to  and  following  1994  that  have  been  identified  by  economic  historians  as 
important shocks to the South African economy. 
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IDENTIFYING AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
This paper offers a decomposition of output fluctuations into aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks in 
South Africa  for  the  period  since  the  early 1960s. Theoretically  motivated  long-run restrictions  are used to 
identify  these  shocks  in  a  three-variable vector-autoregressive  (VAR)  model.  The  aggregate  demand  shocks, 
assumed  to  be  transitory  in  nature,  provide  a  new  measure  of  the  business  cycle,  whereas  the  cumulative 
aggregate supply shocks, assumed to have a long lasting effect on output, provide a novel estimate of potential 
output.  
 
The  research  is  motivated  by  the  South  African  government’s  ongoing  attempts  to  identify  constraints  to 
economic  growth with  the  goal  of  raising  the  sustainable  rate  of  growth  of the  economy  and  employment 
creation.  As  such,  it  contributes  to  the  literature  on  quantifying  measures  of  both  potential  GDP  and,  by 
implication, to studies of the business cycle in South Africa. The overlapping interests of researchers in potential 
GDP and the business cycle are evident from the attention given to potentially pro-cyclical macroeconomic 
policy in the Harvard-based Center for International Development’s (CID) project to study opportunities for 
accelerated growth in South Africa (Frankel, Smit and Sturzenegger, 2007). 
  
The first section of the paper is a brief introduction to the South African literature on measuring potential GDP. 
This is followed by an exposition of the structural VAR method used to identify the various shocks to output. 
Section three describes the data used and section four follows with the empirical results.  
 
1.  LITERATURE  
 
With the notable exception of De Jager and Smal (1984), the empirical literature on potential GDP in South 
Africa is fairly recent. Many of these studies compare different methods making it difficult to classify the South 
African literature according to method, as is done in many of the international surveys, for example, DuPasquier, 
Guay and St-Amant (1999).  
 
The  focus  of  the  literature  has,  however,  been  on  contrasting  univariate  statistical  techniques,  notably  the  
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Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, with structural production function methods2. Production function models in this 
literature generally rely on a Cobb-Douglas functional form (though Smit and Burrows (2002) also estimate a 
CES functional form). It is expected that the univariate statistical filters will generate potential GDP growth rates 
close to the observed experience for a given period, but it is striking that the production function models yield 
very similar estimates of potential GDP.  
 
While the comparative studies have indicated considerable agreement across methods in the estimates of potential 
GDP for given historical intervals in South Africa, the empirical macroeconomic literature that uses potential 
GDP to generate output gaps has, predominantly used the Hodrick-Prescott filter to identify potential GDP. 
Examples of these include: Kaseeram, Nicola and Mainardi (2004), Burger and Marinkov (2006), Geldenhuys and 
Marinkov (2006), Woglom (2005), Knedlik (2006), and Fedderke and Schaling (2005). 
 
2.  IDENTIFYING AGGREGATE SUPPLY AND DEMAND SHOCKS: AN SVAR ANALYSIS 
 
The influential literature, starting with Shapiro and Watson (1988) and Blanchard and Quah (1989),  uses long-run 
restrictions based on neutrality properties in the theory of macroeconomic dynamics to identify permanent and 
transitory shocks to real output. While Blanchard and Quah (1989) interpreted the permanent shocks as aggregate 
supply shocks and the transitory shocks as aggregate demand shocks, the technique has since become widely used 
to generate joint estimates of potential GDP (the cumulative aggregate supply shock) and a measure of business 
cycle fluctuations relative to GDP (the cumulative aggregate demand shock) (DuPasquier et al., 1999).  
 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) identified these shocks in a bivariate vector-autoregressive (VAR) model assumed to 
have one unit root (in real GDP) and a covariance stationary variable (the rate of unemployment). This model can 
be extended in various directions by adding more variables with unit roots and/or by expanding the model with 
covariance stationary variables. The early example of King, Plosser, Stock and Watson (1991) used both these 
extensions,  while  Galí  (1992)  and  Clarida  and  Galí  (1994)  decomposed  the  demand  shock  into  several 
components and kept one aggregate supply shock with a unit root. This paper follows Clarida and Galí’s (1994) 
three-variable model by explicitly combining real GDP with two demand shocks, one interpreted as a fiscal policy 
                                                       
2 Examples include: Smit and Burrows (2002), Arora and Bhundia (2003), Du Toit and Moolman (2003), Akinboade (2005), 
and Du Toit, Van Eyden and Ground (2006)  
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shock and the other as a monetary policy shock.  
 
The technical exposition follows Clarida and Galí (1994), and starts with the proposition that the three variables 
(the  first  difference  of  real  GDP,  the  fiscal  policy  measure,  and  the  monetary  policy  measure)  are  jointly 
determined  by  a  simultaneous  equation  system  which  can  be  represented  by  a  covariance  stationary  MA 
representation such as equation 1, 






























                                              (1) 
where {yt, gt, rt} refers to (log) real GDP, the fiscal policy measure, and the real interest rate respectively and {εt} 
are the structural shocks identified with each of these variables. But this system (equation 1) is not observable and 
cannot  be  estimated.  Instead  we  can  estimate  a  reduced  form  VAR  with  the  MA  representation  shown  in 
equation 2: 
















                                                    (2) 
where {ut} are the reduced form disturbances. The variance covariance matrix is given in equation 3: 
Σ= Eutut
'                                                      (3) 
 
Assume that a non-singular matrix S exists such that ut = Sεt. which implies that C(L) = R(L)S. Keep in mind that 
by construction R(0)=I, which means that C(0)=S.  
 
After normalising the elements of {εt} so that their variance covariance is the identity matrix, it follows that 
equation 3 can be written as: 
'
0 0 ´ ´) ´ ( ´) ( C C SS S S E uu E = = = = Σ εε                                 (4) 
 
where C0 is the (3×3) matrix of contemporaneous structural relationships. Because equation 4 provides only six  
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independent equations, three additional restrictions are required in order to estimate the full matrix and identify 
the nine elements of C0. Once this matrix has been computed, identification of the structural shocks {εt} follows 
directly from inverting the relationship u= C0εt. The structural representation obtains from inverting C(L) = R(L) 
C0. 
 
Where do these three additional restrictions, to orthogonalise the system, come from? It was Blanchard and 
Quah’s  (1989)  suggestion,  that  restrictions  on  the  long-run  relationship  between  the  three  variables  might 
complete  the  identification  scheme.  In  their  case  it  required  only  one  long-run  restriction,  viz.  a  neutrality 
condition that the demand shock would not affect real output in the long run. However, in the three-variable 
model used here, we require three additional restrictions to identify the structural shocks and the dynamics of the 
structural system C(L).  
 
Define C(1)  as C0 + C1 + C2 +… and use this to define three additional restrictions. The first two of these long-
run restrictions require that fiscal and monetary policy shocks have no long-run effects on real GDP, as expressed 
in equation 5: 
C12 1 ()= C13 1 ()=0                                                (5) 
 
Finally, the long-run effect of monetary policy on the stance of fiscal policy is also restricted to zero as expressed 
in equation 6:  
C23 1 ()=0                                                       (6) 
 
This last restriction implies that monetary shocks (that affect the real interest rate) do not have long-run effects 
on the level of government consumption relative to GDP, the variable we will use to measure fiscal policy. This, 
of course, requires strong assumptions on the preferences for public goods to be true.  
 
These  restrictions  create  a  lower-triangular  matrix  C(1),  which  is  sufficient  to  recover  the  dynamics  of  the 
structural system, C1, C2, … as well as the structural shocks (Clarida and Galí, 1994).  
 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) were cautious in interpreting the resulting identified shocks as aggregate supply and  
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demand shocks.  The long-run neutrality condition is not generally sufficient to identify demand shocks, since 
demand shocks might (under certain conditions) have a long-run impact on output, while aggregate supply shocks 
may also impact at business cycle frequencies or be short-lived. At best their identification scheme was “nearly 
correct” (Blanchard and Quah, 1989: 659), and the extent to which it was correct is an empirical matter.  
 
To investigate the plausibility of the identification scheme on the model posed here for South African data, we 
consider the same output as Blanchard and Quah, viz. impulse response functions and a variance decomposition 
analysis, a historical decomposition of the output effects of the structural shocks, and a comparison of this 
historical decomposition with independent information about the business cycle and factors affecting aggregate 
supply in South Africa.  
 
3.  DATA 
The data are seasonally adjusted quarterly time series, starting in the second quarter of 1960 and ending in the 
fourth quarter of 20063. Table 1 shows the variables used in the model and Figures 1 to 3 plot the three main 
variables. The reduced form VAR was estimated with four lags.  
 
Table 1 about here  
 
Figure 1 about here  
 
As a further robustness check, the estimation and identification were implemented on the entire sample starting 
in the second quarter of 1960 and on a sub-sample starting in the fourth quarter of 1983. This check was carried 
out for two reasons. Firstly, the important evolution of the monetary policy regime in South Africa during the 
early eighties when quantitative controls were largely abandoned in favour of market-based instruments, as was 
recommended by the De Kock Commission (1985). Secondly, as can be seen in Figure 2, there is some doubt 
over the covariance stationarity4 of the fiscal policy proxy over the longer sample, a problem which is less serious 
                                                       
3 The data for the fourth quarter are an estimate.  
4 Ideally all the variables in the estimated model should be covariance stationary, which implies that they must not have 
stochastic trends. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were used to test for the presence of unit roots and are reported in  
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in the shorter sample (the unit root tests are reported in Appendix A).   
 
Figure 2 about here  
 
Figure 3 about here  
 
As a proxy for the stance of fiscal policy we use government consumption, rather than the deficit. Many other 
measures of the stance of fiscal policy, such as the budget balance, are jointly determined with the economic cycle 
and are inappropriate for the purpose at hand. Since government revenue accounts for a large portion of the joint 
endogeneity between the budget balance and the economic cycle, a useful proxy of the fiscal stance for purposes 
of judging the cyclicality of fiscal policy is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP. This is also the measure 
used by Fatás and Mihov (2003) to investigate the potentially destabilising role of fiscal policy in a large cross-
country study.  
 
As a proxy for monetary policy we use the real interest rate. Alternative estimations using the inflation rate itself 
were done, delivering comparable results which are available upon request.  
4.  RESULTS 
This section reports impulse responses and historical decompositions to support the plausibility of the identified 
supply and demand shocks proposed here.  
 
4.1 Innovation accounting 
Innovation accounting entails considering the impulse responses and variance decomposition of structural VAR 
models. The first task is to inspect the impulse response functions of the identified shocks to determine whether 
they  match theoretical priors concerning the direction  and  magnitude of  impact.  Figure 4 below shows the 
impulse responses of real GDP for each of the identified shocks and for both the longer and shorter sample 
models.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Appendix A.   
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Figure 4 about here 
 
The impulse responses in Figure 4 are consistent with theoretical priors. The supply shock has a permanent 
impact on real GDP, while the two components of aggregate demand have, by construction, only transitory 
impacts. A positive fiscal shock has a temporary expansionary impact on real GDP and a positive shock to the 
real interest rate has a temporary contractionary impact on real output. The fiscal effect is stronger in the longer 
sample, though that should be interpreted cautiously given the potential non-stationarity of the fiscal proxy over 
that sample. 
 
The variance decomposition of real GDP shows the proportion of the variance of real GDP which can be 
accounted for by the three identified shocks over various horizons. Table 2 contains the variance decomposition 
for real GDP, from which two deductions follow. Firstly, the long-run development of real GDP is dominated by 
the history of supply shocks. Secondly, over the short to medium term, fiscal shocks dominate monetary shocks 
in their impact on real GDP, but only in the model estimated on the longer sample. In the post-1983 sample the 
relative importance of monetary and fiscal policy shocks are reversed.  
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
This difference between the variance decompositions of the shorter and longer sample models might be due to 
the changing average size and variability of the three structural shocks over the sample period. Figure 5 uses box 
plots by decade to show how the distribution of these shocks has changed over time. The monetary policy shocks 
have become more dispersed since the 1960s, while the opposite seems to have happened with the GDP growth 
and fiscal policy shocks. A model estimated over the entire sample period therefore combines two very different 
periods (with a pivotal point around 1980) in the monetary history of South Africa. This stylised observation can 
be sensibly connected with the reforms of the monetary policy regime introduced by the De Kock commission 
and implemented in the course of the early to middle 1980s.  
 
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of the real interest rate relative to the three identified shocks for both 
samples. A positive supply shock raises the real interest rate temporarily in both samples. This is expected from  
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the transitory disinflationary impact of a positive supply shock.  A positive fiscal shock lowers the real interest 
rate temporarily, notably in the model estimated on the shorter sample, which suggests that over that sample a 
fiscal stimulus meets with accommodating monetary policy. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
Figure 7 shows the impulse response functions for government expenditure relative to the three identified shocks 
for both samples. The reaction of the fiscal proxy to a supply shock in both samples suggests that GDP responds 
faster to a positive supply shock than government expenditure. At least in the model estimated on the shorter 
sample, government expenditure catches up with GDP over the medium term. The positive response of a fiscal 
shock to a rise in the real interest rate might suggest a counteracting fiscal response to a monetary policy shock, 
but even at its maximum, the effect is very small and is not of great practical interest.  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
4.2 Historical decomposition 
The moving average representation of the structural system, i.e. equation 1, can be used to decompose the 
historical real GDP series into paths attributable to each of the identified shocks. For example, the structural 
VAR can be used to plot the evolution of real GDP under the assumption that both demand shocks are zero, to 
yield a measure of supply shocks to GDP which, aggregated over time and added to any non-stationary drift, may 
construct an estimate of potential GDP. Similar historical decompositions can be used to plot the contribution of 
the two demand shocks to the time path of GDP and jointly they will yield a measure of the business cycle.  
Figure 8 shows the historical decomposition of real GDP into components due to supply shocks, fiscal shocks, 
and monetary shocks5. 
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
                                                       
5 The series for the potential output and business cycle measures are presented in Appendix B.   
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The major difference between the historical decompositions for the short and longer sample models lies in the 
much larger contribution of fiscal shocks to GDP in the longer sample. For example, fiscal policy has contributed 
positively to real GDP since about 2000 on both estimates, but much more powerfully so in the model estimated 
on the longer sample. However, in both models the supply shocks dominate fluctuations in real GDP.  
 
The patterns of the cumulated supply shocks are not identical in the two models but show remarkable similarity, 
with both recording continued negative supply shocks from the mid-eighties through 1994, after which positive 
supply shocks moved actual and potential real GDP up. Figure 9 shows the estimated potential GDP for the 
shorter and longer samples yielded by this decomposition.  
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
The longer sample yields an opportunity to quantify the cumulative loss in aggregate supply suffered by the South 
African economy in the twilight of apartheid. The top graph in figure 9 shows that the generally positive supply 
shocks of the sixties were reversed from 1973 onwards. Adverse international events, notably the first oil shock, 
but also the collapse of the Portuguese colonies (Mozambique and Angola) which created hostile states on the 
borders of South Africa, signalled the start of two decades of adverse supply shocks.  Domestic unrest in 1976 
and again in the mid-1980s, the debt standstill in 1985, and the final unravelling of the National Party’s grip on 
political power were all along the path of declining potential GDP, most likely fuelled by significant human and 
capital flight.  
 
Figure 10 matches important international events, political developments, policy decisions, and economic shocks 
to the cumulative supply shocks as identified by the longer sample model. On this measurement potential GDP 
declined by a cumulative 30% relative to trend between the mid-seventies and the mid-nineties. In this way the 
decomposition provides a unique quantification of the costs of maintaining apartheid since the seventies, in a 
time of adverse international shocks. It yields a plausible pattern and magnitude, given historical accounts of the 
economic costs of apartheid by Moll (1991) and Feinstein (2005), for example. 
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Figure 10 about here 
 
The new measure of potential GDP also shows a marked rise in potential GDP since 1994, starting almost 
immediately after the political transition. While the pattern differs for the models estimated on the longer and 
shorter samples (the  longer  sample model shows  a sharper  bounce  in  potential GDP  immediately  after the 
political transition which flattens out after 2000, while the shorter sample model shows a slower initial response 
for potential GDP but an acceleration after 2000), both imply that potential GDP has lately been growing at a 
healthy rate, though well short of the goals set by the South African government. Table 3 shows the growth rate 
of potential GDP for the two models calculated over different sub-samples of the post-1994 era. The estimates in 
Table 3 suggest a range of 2.5% to 4.4% for the growth rate of potential GDP, while 3.5% would be a likely point 
estimate (Frankel et al., 2007: 14).  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
In addition to examining the plausibility of the identified supply shocks, one might also examine the plausibility 
of  the  identified  demand  shocks  through  comparison  with  independent  information  on  the  South  African 
business cycle. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), we compare the cumulative aggregate demand shock with 
the turning points of the South African business cycle as identified by (i) the dating committee of the SARB, and 
(ii) the turning points identified by Du Plessis (2006) using a non-parametric dating algorithm applied to real 
GDP. Figure 11 shows the phases of the business cycle defined with these two methods and the new measure of 
aggregate demand is superimposed onto it 
 
The  measure  of  aggregate  demand  identified  with  the  long-run  restrictions  matches  the  periods  of  relative 
expansion and relative contraction in the South African economy surprisingly well. This is particularly the case 
where the comparison is made with Du Plessis’ (2006) alternative turning points, which, he has argued, capture 
the periods of relative contraction and expansion in the South African GDP more accurately than the official 
turning points.  
 
The only real anomaly in the comparison is the apparent positive demand shock during the contraction following  
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the peak of June 1984. Du Plessis and Smit (2007) examined the circumstances of this contraction and found that 
it  was  the  only  post-1980  contraction  in  South  Africa  during  which  the  monetary  authorities  provided  a 
cumulatively large nominal and particularly real reduction in their policy interest rate. Not all downswings are due 
to demand shocks (in this case the demand shock from monetary policy was notably positive) and in this case the 
downswing is largely explained by a sharp negative supply shock as identified (see Figure 10). The model as 
presented here, is not sensitive enough to identify the precise nature of that supply shock, but Frankel, Smit and 
Sturzenegger (2007: 11) highlight two developments that were particularly adverse in 1984 and would have ended 
in the supply shock as identified here, i.e. a precipitous decline in  public investment and depressed terms of 
trade.  
 
Apart form this period, the new business cycle measure matches existing evidence closely.  Following Blanchard 
and  Quah  (1989: 665), we  interpret  this  close match  between the  business cycle measure, generated  by the 
identified demand shocks, and independent business cycle information as suggestive of the plausibility of the 
identified demand shocks.  
5.  CONCLUSION 
This paper applies a structural VAR method to identify aggregate supply and demand shocks for the South 
African economy since the 1960s. The impulse responses suggest that the identified structural shocks and system 
dynamics are theory consistent. Further, the identified aggregate supply shock is used to yield a new measure of 
potential GDP and of the business cycle. The new measure of potential GDP suggests that the South African 
economy suffered a 30% relative decline in potential GDP between the mid-seventies and mid-nineties as the 
internal and external costs of apartheid rose at a time of disruption in the world economy. It also suggests that the 
present trajectory potential GDP is growing by about 2.5% to 4.4% per year with a likely value of around 3.5%. 
This order of magnitude compares favourably with some of the more recent calculations in the literature such as 
Du Toit, Van Eyden and Ground (2006).  
 
The identified demand shock was also used to create a new measure of the South African business cycle, which 
matched independent information about the business cycle. The plausible history of the new measures for the 





Table 1    Data 
Variable  Calculation  Source 
∆yt  First difference of the log 
of real GDP 
SARB, RB6006D 
gt  Ratio of government 
consumption to GDP 
SARB, RB6008D, 
RB6006D 
rt  Real interest rate calculated 
using monthly data and a 
within-quarter formula6  
SARB, Discount rate and 
CPI index, RB 7032N 
 
 
Table 2    Variance decomposition of real GDP   
Longer sample (1960+) 
                                                       
6 For each quarter the real interest rate was calculated using monthly data and the following formula where mt means the 
second month of the quarter: 
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Variance Decomposition of GDP
Supply Shock Fiscal Shock Monetary Shock
1 69.0% 28.3% 2.6%
2 67.6% 31.4% 1.0%
3 58.6% 37.0% 4.4%
4 62.2% 35.2% 2.6%
5 64.0% 33.3% 2.7%
6 63.4% 33.6% 2.9%
7 68.3% 29.9% 1.8%
8 70.0% 28.1% 1.9%
9 72.0% 26.5% 1.5%
10 74.7% 24.2% 1.2%
11 75.9% 23.0% 1.1%
12 77.6% 21.6% 0.9%
13 78.9% 20.3% 0.8%
14 80.1% 19.3% 0.7%
15 81.3% 18.1% 0.6%
20 85.9% 13.7% 0.3%
30 91.6% 8.2% 0.1%
50 96.6% 3.4% 0.0%
75 98.7% 1.3% 0.0%




Shorter sample (1983+) 
 
 
Table 3    Growth rate of potential GDP during different sub-samples 
  Longer sample (1960+)  Shorter sample (1983+) 
1994Q1 to present  3.13%  3.32% 
1996Q1 to present  2.74%  3.34% 
1998Q1 to present  2.82%  3.42% 
2000Q1 to present  2.56%  3.58% 
2002Q1 to present  2.62%  4.17% 










Variance Decomposition of GDP
Supply Shock Fiscal Shock Monetary Shock
1 88.7% 1.0% 10.3%
2 86.0% 5.1% 8.9%
3 82.4% 3.0% 14.6%
4 88.2% 3.7% 8.1%
5 88.3% 3.3% 8.4%
6 90.9% 2.4% 6.7%
7 93.5% 1.5% 5.0%
8 94.7% 1.2% 4.1%
9 96.1% 0.6% 3.3%
10 97.3% 0.4% 2.3%
11 97.8% 0.2% 2.0%
12 98.4% 0.1% 1.5%
13 98.8% 0.0% 1.2%
14 99.0% 0.0% 1.0%
15 99.2% 0.0% 0.8%
20 99.7% 0.0% 0.2%
30 99.9% 0.0% 0.0%
50 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
75 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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Figure 6   Impulse response of the real interest rate for each of the identified shocks 
Longer sample (1960+) 
Shorter sample (1983+) 
 
   



























































































































































Response of Real Interest Rate to Monetary Shock 
  20
Figure 7   Impulse response of government consumption to real GDP for each of the identified shocks 
Longer sample (1960+)   Shorter sample (1983+) 
 
   



































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 9   New measure of aggregate supply  
Longer sample (1960+) 
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Figure 11   New measure of aggregate demand 
Longer sample (1960+)  Shorter sample (1983+) 





Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests were used to test the null hypothesis of a unit root in the series used here, the 
results of which are reported in Table 2. There is no evidence of unit roots either in the real GDP differenced 
series or in the series for real interest rates, but it is not possible to reject the hypothesis of a unit root for the 
fiscal policy proxy. This raises a concern over the stability of the VAR. Of course, there may be concern over the 
low power of unit root tests, and thus for a variable such as government expenditure over GDP, it is unlikely to 
drift forever away from a reasonably stable value. However, to determine how serious this may be, we computed 
the eigenvalues of the SVAR system. We found that all the eigenvalues lie within the unit circle, and therefore 
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Table 2     Unit root tests 
ADF critical values  Variable  Sample 
No. deterministic 
components 
Constant  Constant and 
trend 
∆yt  1960+  -2.691***  -4.656**  -5.007*** 
∆yt  1984+  -2.155**  -3.499**  -4.339*** 
gt  1960+  1.319  -1.605  -1.251 
gt  1984+  0.101  -1.856  -2.082 
rt  1960+  -3.348***  -3.874***  -4.438*** 
rt  1984+  -2.453**  -3.336**  -4.313*** 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics were estimated with four lags.  
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level 
 
APPENDIX B 
The following table shows the historical decomposition of the South African real GDP for both versions of the 
SVAR estimated here.  Table B.1 shows real GDP, the implied measure of potential GDP and the implied 
business cycle measure for the model estimated over the longer sample, while table B.2 shows the same for the 
model estimated over the shorter sample.  
 
Table B.1   Historical decomposition of real GDP, 1960+ model 










1961Q1  280645      1984Q1  712,246  707,749  4,497 
1961Q2  279418  283167  -3749  1984Q2  727,042  714,400  12,642 
1961Q3  285659  283449  2210  1984Q3  714,992  728,019  -13,027 
1961Q4  288256  290732  -2476  1984Q4  716,097  714,684  1,413 
1962Q1  295712  292920  2792  1985Q1  711,831  714,610  -2,779 
1962Q2  297606  299595  -1989  1985Q2  706,655  708,350  -1,695 
1962Q3  303416  302913  503  1985Q3  704,790  706,933  -2,143  
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1962Q4  307302  306557  745  1985Q4  712,326  705,216  7,110 
1963Q1  311367  311769  -402  1986Q1  703,840  708,664  -4,824 
1963Q2  319600  317527  2073  1986Q2  708,699  706,771  1,928 
1963Q3  328035  325041  2994  1986Q3  710,294  706,866  3,428 
1963Q4  333815  334466  -651  1986Q4  713,276  712,693  583 
1964Q1  340068  337771  2297  1987Q1  718,464  715,712  2,752 
1964Q2  346223  345497  726  1987Q2  721,026  718,399  2,627 
1964Q3  349476  350386  -910  1987Q3  723,657  725,103  -1,446 
1964Q4  359695  355056  4639  1987Q4  732,541  728,796  3,745 
1965Q1  366616  367366  -750  1988Q1  743,550  739,377  4,173 
1965Q2  370162  370889  -727  1988Q2  748,830  749,396  -566 
1965Q3  368994  374783  -5789  1988Q3  758,901  752,597  6,304 
1965Q4  375131  373424  1707  1988Q4  766,027  763,268  2,759 
1966Q1  380399  380678  -279  1989Q1  770,771  766,328  4,443 
1966Q2  384539  385573  -1034  1989Q2  774,115  772,109  2,006 
1966Q3  390204  389833  371  1989Q3  774,737  779,949  -5,212 
1966Q4  391488  396036  -4548  1989Q4  769,943  775,540  -5,597 
1967Q1  405721  399068  6653  1990Q1  770,559  769,851  708 
1967Q2  406366  411623  -5257  1990Q2  769,923  777,447  -7,524 
1967Q3  426799  414815  11984  1990Q3  769,276  770,191  -915 
1967Q4  419050  433949  -14899  1990Q4  769,990  768,754  1,236 
1968Q1  425930  424204  1726  1991Q1  763,866  771,276  -7,410 
1968Q2  427818  432497  -4679  1991Q2  762,142  762,986  -844 
1968Q3  432436  433126  -690  1991Q3  761,846  762,718  -872 
1968Q4  440612  438117  2495  1991Q4  760,536  757,442  3,094 
1969Q1  443778  445886  -2108  1992Q1  755,206  763,368  -8,162 
1969Q2  443404  448967  -5563  1992Q2  750,574  755,680  -5,106 
1969Q3  463653  453410  10243  1992Q3  741,884  751,311  -9,427 
1969Q4  457395  466872  -9477  1992Q4  735,580  745,938  -10,358 
1970Q1  467240  463084  4156  1993Q1  742,097  736,393  5,704 
1970Q2  476774  474001  2773  1993Q2  750,237  741,863  8,374 
1970Q3  471270  480793  -9523  1993Q3  761,036  757,883  3,153 
1970Q4  487852  478221  9631  1993Q4  766,675  764,697  1,978  
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1971Q1  495078  495523  -445  1994Q1  765,582  768,591  -3,009 
1971Q2  491042  495761  -4719  1994Q2  773,888  770,962  2,926 
1971Q3  497438  495875  1563  1994Q3  782,592  772,707  9,885 
1971Q4  501,014  502,783  -1,769  1994Q4  795,654  791,452  4,202 
1972Q1  498,060  507,077  -9,017  1995Q1  798,528  801,723  -3,195 
1972Q2  503,271  502,753  518  1995Q2  802,074  807,016  -4,942 
1972Q3  503,582  505,273  -1,691  1995Q3  805,536  815,626  -10,090 
1972Q4  512,500  509,763  2,737  1995Q4  808,715  810,934  -2,219 
1973Q1  519,110  515,558  3,552  1996Q1  820,063  816,103  3,960 
1973Q2  516,801  524,457  -7,656  1996Q2  835,424  827,319  8,105 
1973Q3  531,747  523,353  8,394  1996Q3  844,904  841,808  3,096 
1973Q4  541,990  536,596  5,394  1996Q4  852,917  848,159  4,758 
1974Q1  552,117  546,061  6,056  1997Q1  855,368  859,269  -3,901 
1974Q2  559,706  557,263  2,443  1997Q2  860,600  864,740  -4,140 
1974Q3  566,045  561,454  4,591  1997Q3  862,397  869,707  -7,310 
1974Q4  560,702  569,544  -8,842  1997Q4  863,699  871,166  -7,467 
1975Q1  558,456  565,891  -7,435  1998Q1  864,791  871,465  -6,674 
1975Q2  568,083  560,360  7,723  1998Q2  866,014  872,349  -6,335 
1975Q3  572,631  572,873  -242  1998Q3  864,116  859,779  4,337 
1975Q4  577,353  576,964  389  1998Q4  864,951  873,521  -8,570 
1976Q1  584,941  580,970  3,971  1999Q1  872,905  879,230  -6,325 
1976Q2  573,271  585,180  -11,909  1999Q2  879,852  883,014  -3,162 
1976Q3  586,910  578,782  8,128  1999Q3  889,461  894,597  -5,136 
1976Q4  582,621  592,304  -9,683  1999Q4  899,242  895,557  3,685 
1977Q1  581,348  584,227  -2,879  2000Q1  909,357  906,289  3,068 
1977Q2  581,907  584,011  -2,104  2000Q2  917,724  913,835  3,889 
1977Q3  579,661  585,840  -6,179  2000Q3  926,813  924,461  2,352 
1977Q4  582,638  578,689  3,949  2000Q4  934,698  935,643  -945 
1978Q1  592,219  591,355  864  2001Q1  940,768  942,358  -1,590 
1978Q2  603,664  598,298  5,366  2001Q2  945,471  949,205  -3,734 
1978Q3  597,170  599,191  -2,021  2001Q3  947,982  958,571  -10,589 
1978Q4  602,605  602,585  20  2001Q4  955,271  953,068  2,203 
1979Q1  613,153  607,610  5,543  2002Q1  965,346  956,339  9,007  
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1979Q2  617,114  618,077  -963  2002Q2  977,594  968,088  9,506 
1979Q3  621,720  615,392  6,328  2002Q3  988,659  981,114  7,545 
1979Q4  634,479  625,926  8,553  2002Q4  996,885  993,695  3,190 
1980Q1  647,514  644,735  2,779  2003Q1  1,003,734  1,009,525  -5,791 
1980Q2  659,823  649,345  10,478  2003Q2  1,009,319  1,019,042  -9,723 
1980Q3  671,120  665,270  5,850  2003Q3  1,015,432  1,021,499  -6,067 
1980Q4  672,628  669,836  2,792  2003Q4  1,022,567  1,028,894  -6,327 
1981Q1  680,982  684,229  -3,247  2004Q1  1,037,622  1,029,023  8,599 
1981Q2  695,854  689,418  6,436  2004Q2  1,054,288  1,046,140  8,148 
1981Q3  705,981  696,186  9,795  2004Q3  1,072,821  1,068,462  4,359 
1981Q4  710,386  714,617  -4,231  2004Q4  1,082,341  1,077,836  4,505 
1982Q1  703,805  712,172  -8,367  2005Q1  1,094,907  1,093,412  1,495 
1982Q2  697,932  706,267  -8,335  2005Q2  1,109,662  1,107,209  2,453 
1982Q3  697,754  704,000  -6,246  2005Q3  1,123,529  1,115,994  7,535 
1982Q4  683,003  697,937  -14,934  2005Q4  1,135,402  1,134,710  692 
1983Q1  672,461  684,804  -12,343  2006Q1  1,149,336  1,148,473  863 
1983Q2  675,253  676,992  -1,739  2006Q2  1,164,856  1,153,124  11,732 
1983Q3  683,038  679,034  4,004  2006Q3  1,178,196  1,172,574  5,622 





Table B.2   Historical decomposition of real GDP, 1983+ model 










1984Q3  714,992      1995Q4  808,715  812,648  -3,933 
1984Q4  716,097  715,862  235  1996Q1  820,063  819,265  798 
1985Q1  711,831  711,712  119  1996Q2  835,424  831,189  4,235 
1985Q2  706,655  707,126  -471  1996Q3  844,904  844,840  64 
1985Q3  704,790  703,934  856  1996Q4  852,917  852,027  890 
1985Q4  712,326  712,971  -645  1997Q1  855,368  857,167  -1,799 
1986Q1  703,840  707,721  -3,881  1997Q2  860,600  862,011  -1,411 
1986Q2  708,699  706,500  2,199  1997Q3  862,397  867,317  -4,920 
1986Q3  710,294  712,618  -2,324  1997Q4  863,699  869,058  -5,359  
  29
1986Q4  713,276  715,099  -1,823  1998Q1  864,791  868,182  -3,391 
1987Q1  718,464  716,748  1,716  1998Q2  866,014  869,456  -3,442 
1987Q2  721,026  722,329  -1,303  1998Q3  864,116  864,621  -505 
1987Q3  723,657  727,253  -3,596  1998Q4  864,951  867,599  -2,648 
1987Q4  732,541  733,319  -778  1999Q1  872,905  871,124  1,781 
1988Q1  743,550  741,232  2,318  1999Q2  879,852  881,271  -1,419 
1988Q2  748,830  749,096  -266  1999Q3  889,461  887,406  2,055 
1988Q3  758,901  758,177  724  1999Q4  899,242  895,363  3,879 
1988Q4  766,027  762,934  3,093  2000Q1  909,357  902,938  6,419 
1989Q1  770,771  768,964  1,807  2000Q2  917,724  913,121  4,603 
1989Q2  774,115  772,880  1,235  2000Q3  926,813  924,856  1,957 
1989Q3  774,737  772,693  2,044  2000Q4  934,698  932,912  1,786 
1989Q4  769,943  769,680  263  2001Q1  940,768  940,219  549 
1990Q1  770,559  766,905  3,654  2001Q2  945,471  943,960  1,511 
1990Q2  769,923  770,718  -795  2001Q3  947,982  949,437  -1,455 
1990Q3  769,276  771,874  -2,598  2001Q4  955,271  953,100  2,171 
1990Q4  769,990  768,419  1,571  2002Q1  965,346  964,053  1,293 
1991Q1  763,866  762,680  1,186  2002Q2  977,594  976,058  1,536 
1991Q2  762,142  758,672  3,470  2002Q3  988,659  990,264  -1,605 
1991Q3  761,846  760,235  1,611  2002Q4  996,885  1,000,712  -3,827 
1991Q4  760,536  759,002  1,534  2003Q1  1,003,734  1,006,929  -3,195 
1992Q1  755,206  758,851  -3,645  2003Q2  1,009,319  1,015,263  -5,944 
1992Q2  750,574  752,041  -1,467  2003Q3  1,015,432  1,018,659  -3,227 
1992Q3  741,884  745,823  -3,939  2003Q4  1,022,567  1,022,961  -394 
1992Q4  735,580  737,725  -2,145  2004Q1  1,037,622  1,033,262  4,360 
1993Q1  742,097  738,799  3,298  2004Q2  1,054,288  1,049,575  4,713 
1993Q2  750,237  743,953  6,284  2004Q3  1,072,821  1,069,526  3,295 
1993Q3  761,036  758,532  2,504  2004Q4  1,082,341  1,080,983  1,358 
1993Q4  766,675  766,010  665  2005Q1  1,094,907  1,093,305  1,602 
1994Q1  765,582  767,155  -1,573  2005Q2  1,109,662  1,107,435  2,227 
1994Q2  773,888  773,555  333  2005Q3  1,123,529  1,120,809  2,720 
1994Q3  782,592  781,234  1,358  2005Q4  1,135,402  1,133,819  1,583 
1994Q4  795,654  795,213  441  2006Q1  1,149,336  1,150,461  -1,125  
  30
1995Q1  798,528  801,598  -3,070  2006Q2  1,164,856  1,162,177  2,679 
1995Q2  802,074  807,906  -5,832  2006Q3  1,178,196  1,176,693  1,503 
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